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Abstract
The paper seeks to contribute to the social interactions literature by exploiting data on
individuals’ self-selection into neighborhoods. We study a model in which households search for
the best location in the presence of neighborhood eﬀects in the formation of children’s human
capital and in the process of cultural transmission. We use micro data from the PSID which
we have merged, using geocodes, with contextual information at the levels of census tracts and
of counties from the 2000 US Census. We control for numerous individual characteristics and
neighborhood attributes and ﬁnd, consistently with neighborhood eﬀects models, that households
with children, but not those without, are more likely to move out of neighborhoods whose
attributes are not favorable to the production of human capital and the transmission of parents’
cultural traits, and to move into neighborhoods which instead exhibit desirable such attributes.
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11 Introduction
Theories describing that economic outcomes for individuals and groups are inﬂuenced by the social
context continue to be appealing. Yet, the empirical identiﬁcation of such social eﬀects is challeng-
ing. Formal results establishing identiﬁcation conditions do exist [Manski (1993), Brock and Durlauf
(2001a)], but identiﬁcation faces formidable obstacles in practice. One major obstacle is that forces
underlying self-selection by individuals into groups may also aﬀect their behavior. That is, sorting
generates correlated eﬀects in observed individual behavior that are hard to distinguish from neigh-
borhood eﬀects, a particular form of selection bias [Moﬃtt (2001)].1
Presence of sorting is also an opportunity. By choosing among alternative locations, individuals
reveal their preferences for diﬀerent neighborhood characteristics. Therefore, data on moves can
be utilized to infer whether or not, and the extent in which, people value potential neighborhood
eﬀects. This is what we do in the present paper. We rely on economic theory to structure an
empirical investigation of residential moves and seek to infer preferences for neighborhood (social)
characteristics directly from equilibrium outcomes. This approach has an advantage over the study of
government interventions that alter group memberships exogenously (see, for instance, Kling et al.,
2007). As Moﬃtt (2001) stresses, such interventions may not reveal the presence of social eﬀects, if
the system under study reaches a new equilibrium before the eﬀects of social interactions have fully
worked out.
Our approach cannot pin down the magnitude of all neighborhood eﬀects. However, it can help
establish whether households’ residential choices are consistent with their presence. Speciﬁcally, it
allows us to test in a rigorous way key implications of economic theories of social interactions and
cultural transmission, an important class of neighborhood eﬀects.2 That is, as shown for instance by
Zanella (2007), the presence of such eﬀects imply that individuals choose locations that oﬀer desirable
social interactions: when allowed to search for the best neighborhood, they search for the “best”
neighbors – neighbors whose attributes and behavior they value most – and not only for better
access to jobs, attractive dwellings and neighborhood ambience, or other amenities. Furthermore,
at a locational (sorting) equilibrium rents and housing prices also reﬂect the valuation of the social
context, in addition to other neighborhood characteristics, in line with theories of hedonic prices. We
test such necessary conditions for social interactions eﬀects on individual outcomes, by looking at the
impact of the social context on observed residential choices and prices, under the assumption that
households rationally take into account the presence of social eﬀects, if any. The idea that self-selection
can be exploited to identify neighborhood eﬀects was ﬁrst suggested by Brock and Durlauf (2001b).
It has been employed by, among others, Ioannides and Zabel (2008) to help identify contextual eﬀects
1The relevance of this problem is well illustrated in an empirical context by Oreopoulos (2003), who ﬁnds neighbor-
hood eﬀects are irrelevant for households whose place of residence is exogenously assigned but appear to be relevant
for households who endogenously chose where to live. A precursor of this result appears in the work of Evans, Oates
and Schwab (1992).
2Durlauf (2004), and Bisin and Verdier (2008) oﬀer valuable surveys.
2separately from endogenous neighborhood interactions in housing markets.
We deal with the problem of endogeneity of the characteristics of neighborhoods relative to the
characteristics of individuals who live in those neighborhoods by employing a general equilibrium
model that directly suggests instruments. We present below a model where parents value the eﬀects
of social interactions, at the residential neighborhood level, on their children’s acquisition of human
capital and their children’s enculturation within the parents’ own culture.3 T h i si st h ec a s ei f :o n e ,
such economically relevant traits as human capital and non-cognitive ability depend on resource inputs
via social contacts, providing role models and peer eﬀects, and on local public schools;4 and two,
culture is transmitted both directly within the family and indirectly through extra-familial social
interactions. With such derived preferences over neighborhood characteristics and conditional on
their current residential location, households search optimally over alternative locations. Our model
implies that characteristics of broader areas are candidate instruments for the characteristics of smaller
neighborhoods that lie within them. Households “ﬂow” over time through diﬀerent neighborhoods
according to transition probabilities which we derive as part of the equilibrium of the model. These
depend on the characteristics of other individuals in the neighborhood; of whom exactly, however, is
determined at equilibrium.
Our model has several testable implications. Two of them are crucial. First, there exist two diﬀer-
ent regimes governing residential choices: one regime pertains to households with school-age children,
in which social interactions salient for human capital and enculturation matter in the sorting process;
the other regime pertains to households without school-age children, in which such social interactions
do not matter. Second, characteristics that aﬀect human capital acquisition and enculturation should
aﬀect in the same direction the transition probabilities of households in the ﬁrst regime, but not those
in the second regime.
W eu s et w oc o n s e c u t i v ew a v e so ft h eP a n e lS t u d yo fI n c o m eD y n a m i c s( P S I D )a n dd e ﬁne neigh-
borhoods as census tracts, which we have linked (thanks to access to conﬁdential geocodes) with tract-
and county-level contextual information from the 2000 US Census. Our estimation of a residential
search model admits a structural interpretation. We ﬁnd support for key implications of the theory, as
well as additional implications we describe in detail below. In particular, households with and with-
o u ts c h o o l - a g ec h i l d r e nb e h a v ed i ﬀerently; the former are more likely to move out of neighborhoods
with characteristics that are commonly considered as not being conducive to children’s acquisition
of human capital and to transmission of parental cultural traits, and are more likely to move into
neighborhoods whose characteristics are perceived as facilitating such processes. We interpret this as
evidence that household moves depend on preferences for social interactions in addition to strictly
economic factors. This is, in turn, prima facie evidence in favor of theories of neighborhood eﬀects and
3By enculturation we mean “the process where the culture that is currently established teaches an individual the
accepted norms and values of the culture or society in which the individual lives.” (Kottak, 2004, p. 199).
4The relevance of the social context in the process of formation of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities early in life
is emphasized most recently by Cunha and Heckman (2007).
3cultural transmission. Furthermore, we let the data tell us the extent of trade-oﬀs among individual,
contextual and endogenous social interactions eﬀects.
The central ﬁnding of our paper, that social interactions aﬀect residential choices, is reminiscent to
recent work by Calabrese et al. (2006), who show that a locational equilibrium model with neighbor-
hood eﬀects – measured by relative mean community income – ﬁts the data much better than one
without such eﬀects. They use community-level data for the Boston metropolitan area for just 1980.
In contrast, we use data on households that move as well as on households that do not move along
with data on a richer set of neighborhood eﬀects for two consecutive periods, and show that indeed
households with school-age children value social interactions diﬀerently. Households with school-age
children are more sensitive than those without school-age children to measures of peer quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places the paper in relation to the
literature on residential mobility. Section 3 presents a theoretical model with neighborhood eﬀects
that allows us to derive households’ preferences over locations, and to structure the mobility decision in
the presence of social interactions. Section 4 discusses our identiﬁcation strategy. Section 5 describes
the data set, Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Understanding residential mobility
By emphasizing what we think is an important motivation driving residential choices, this research
aims at contributing to a deeper understanding of mobility. People move for a multitude of reasons:
they may wish to locate more conveniently in relation to attractive job opportunities, to location of
family members and of friends, or in order to adjust their housing consumption. Or they may be
prompted to move for exogenous reasons, in which case they make optimal location decisions in the
light of information at their disposal.
A well-established empirical literature has studied how the presence of persistent income diﬀeren-
tials across regions may motivate moves. These studies consistently ﬁnd that search of better economic
prospects is an important factor underlying mobility. In a pioneering investigation that is based on
a human capital investment approach with state-level data, Bowles (1970) found that the expected
income increase from moving out of the US South in the late 1950s was a very good predictor of
migration outﬂows from that region. Recently, Kennan and Walker (2008) estimate a structural dy-
namic model of search among spatially dispersed wage oﬀers that allows for multiple moves. They use
panel data and ﬁnd that diﬀerences in expected income have a strong eﬀect on interstate mobility of
white male Americans. Similarly, Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992) ﬁnd that diﬀerences in returns to
skills constitute a major force driving migration across US states. Their emphasis on returns to skills,
rather than on expected income more broadly, allows them to study, in addition, the composition of
migration ﬂows by destination.
Research on household members’ co-location decisions shows empirically that college-educated
4couples, “power couples,” locate in larger cities mainly because such areas aﬀord them opportunities
to pursue dual careers [Costa and Kahn (2000)]. Similar dual-career motives, as well as their reverse
implications later in life, are also supported by ﬁndings reported in Chen and Rosenthal (2006). The
latter study considers indices of quality-of-life and of quality-of-business in diﬀerent locations, and
matches them with information about migration ﬂows by individual characteristics. While individuals
in prime-age labor force groups, and power couples in particular, tend to move to high quality-of-
business locations (seeking career jobs primarily), older individuals tend to move to high quality-of-life
locations (seeking amenities primarily). Furthermore, a negative correlation between those two indices
suggests that households may face trade-oﬀs when choosing their residence. Clearly, this research
suggests that mobility may be driven by more than quest for improved economic prospects and by
subtle aspects of individual taste and characteristics. This is also conﬁrmed by the results of Ioannides
and Zabel (2008), who ﬁnd signiﬁcant social interactions eﬀects when they treat the neighborhood
choice and quantity of housing decision as joint decisions. They ﬁnd, in particular, that individuals
choose to locate near others like themselves. These authors use micro data for individuals and their
neighbors in small neighborhoods from the American Housing Survey, a data set for dwelling units
and the characteristics of their occupants, which they augment by means of conﬁdential access to
underlying US census-tract level variables. However, their primary data, in eﬀect a set of repeated
cross sections, oﬀer a limited number of individual covariates, relative to what we use in this paper.
In particular, households are not observed in conjunction with residential moves.
Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), although not directly concerned with residential choices, do
provide strong evidence on the importance for white American families of a host of factors that have
come to be known as Schelling-type motives. That is, such families tend to leave locations where
the inﬂow of minorities has brought neighborhood composition – the share of minority residents, in
ibid. – above a “critical” point [ Schelling (1971) ]. Such “neighborhood tipping” models aim at
explaining circumstances under which neighborhoods may change fast. They are also supported by
ﬁeld evidence collected by Wilson and Taub (2006) as well as Census tract level data [ Bruch and
Mare (2006) ]. In the light of this broad literature, we believe that the social context and changes
it may undergo are potentially important for explaining residential mobility, along with improved
economic opportunities. Th i si sw h e r eo u rp a p e ro ﬀers an original contribution.
Such heterogeneity of motives underlying residential choices is consistent with the diversity of
patterns exhibited by moves in the US: some occur over long distances, such as across counties or
states, while others are local, like within the same town or metropolitan area. Local moves, in
particular, may be hard to reconcile with strict labor market considerations. In fact, according to
Current Population Survey (CPS) data, while 60% of US movers in 2004 moved within the same
county, only about 15% of all movers moved in order to take up jobs elsewhere, to look for jobs, or
to live closer to work (see Table 1 for more details).
53T h e o r y
Consider a population of households, each composed of an adult and, possibly, a child. A household’s
location, or neighborhood (we use these terms interchangeably), is indexed by g. Each household
inhabits a location, and parents must choose whether to stay where they are or move elsewhere.
Parents do not have direct preferences over intrinsic characteristics of neighborhoods as such, except
for a location-speciﬁc random shock. With only two generations in the model, the original location
is given at the time such idiosyncratic shock is realized and a new location is chosen. In order to
focus on the social determinants of preferences for neighborhoods, we ignore natural amenities. Let
θ ∈ Θ denote parents’ cultural background, which is summarized in terms of a discrete cultural trait,
such as race, ethnicity, religion, etc. Such a trait aﬀects an adult’s preferences, represented by utility
function Uθ. A parent values own and her child’s consumption, z and z0, respectively, where a prime








where α ∈ [0,1] is a parent’s degree of altruism towards her child. By default, α =0if an individual
has no children. On the other hand, we assume that a parent is always altruistic to some degree, so
in this model having children is indicated α>0. Note that parents are altruistic in a paternalistic
sense, i.e. they evaluate their children’s welfare through their own preferences. The term  θ
g denotes
a culture- and location-speciﬁc random shock. This could reﬂect a new job oﬀer in a particular city,
breakup of an existing job or a family breakup, both of which may induce speciﬁc location demands.
We show below that in equilibrium a parent cares about her child’s human capital, h0 (an economic
motive), and her child’s cultural trait θ
0 (a cultural motive).5
A child’s human capital is determined by a technology whose inputs include human capital of her
parent, h, other household characteristics denoted by a vector x, average income of the community
containing location g, mg, and a child’s own eﬀort, such as study eﬀort, e:
h
0 = f (h,x,mg,e). (2)
Function f(·) is assumed to be increasing in all of its arguments (the signs of the elements of x having
been chosen so to be consistent with this assumption). Dependence on h and x reﬂects interactions
within the family, while dependence on mg accounts for quality of schools and other local public
goods. We allow for peer eﬀects in human capital acquisition via a cost function for study eﬀort,
c(e;eg),w h e r eeg denotes mean eﬀort of a child’s peers in neighborhood g. We assume that this
function is increasing convex with respect to own eﬀort e,a n dt h a tp e e re ﬀects are beneﬁcial, that is,
5Parents’ preferences over their children’s human capital and over their cultural trait may clash. For instance, ﬁrst-
generation immigrant parents might like their children to use the language of their ancestors as their primary language,
but this might hamper the skills their children need in order to function most eﬀectively in the host country.
6the marginal cost of own eﬀort decreases with mean eﬀort in the reference group within neighborhood
g,f o r m a l l yceeg < 0. 6 This assumption expresses such advantageous eﬀects as students’ learning
from one another, imitating each other’s working habits, which may also operate through standards
of eﬀort set by teachers, etc.
A child’s cultural trait is determined by the technology suggested by Bisin and Verdier (2001).
Ap a r e n tm a yi n ﬂuence the transmission of her own cultural trait, θ, by exerting direct socialization
eﬀort d ∈ [0,1], measured as the degree of contact of her child with culture within the family, or
equivalently the probability that a child acquires the trait of her parent via “vertical socialization”,
i.e. within the family. The associated cost to a parent is denoted by a convex increasing cost function
e c(d). Alternatively, the child may be indirectly socialized with cultural trait θ via social interactions
with individuals who carry that same trait in the neighborhood. This second process of socialization
within the neighborhood, or “oblique socialization,” occurs with probability 1 − d. The probability
that a child meet an individual in neighborhood g who carries the same cultural trait is equal to the
local share of that trait, and is denoted φ
θ
g. Therefore, a child whose parent has trait θ inherits that
trait with probability q(θ,θ) ≡ d+(1− d)φ
θ
g, via either vertical or oblique socialization, and acquires
some other trait τ ∈ Θ, τ 6= θ, with probability q(θ,τ) ≡ (1 − d)φ
τ










The solution can be characterized, using backward induction, by ﬁrst considering a child’s choice
of eﬀort, then a parent’s choice of consumption, socialization eﬀort and location, conditional on the
child’s decision process. A child knows that her own human capital, and so her own future income, is
aﬀected by own eﬀo r tv i a( 2 ) .S h ec h o o s e se ﬀort by solving problem maxe : f (h,x,mg,e) − c(e;eg).
Under some regularity conditions, the optimal level of eﬀort depends on family characteristics, h and
x, as well as on the respective average characteristics of families in the neighborhood, hg and xg,a s
well as average income in the community. By substituting for optimal eﬀort into (2), a child’s optimal
human capital depends on those same variables. Conditional on a child’s optimal choice, a parent
maximizes the expected value of (1) with respect to consumption, socialization eﬀort, and location
(z,d,g) subject to two additional constraints: ﬁrst, to a budget constraint,
z + rg + e c(d) ≤ hwg,( 3 )
where wg and rg are the wage (per unit of human capital) and the housing rental rates, respectively,
at location g; second, to the cultural trait transmission mechanism. This part of the problem may be
decomposed further into two stages. At a second stage, a parent chooses consumption and socialization
eﬀort, given location, and considering the trade-oﬀ between vertical and oblique socialization and the
budget constraint. At a ﬁrst stage, location is chosen in order to maximize the value of the process.
6Such an assumption is consistent with empirical evidence on the interdependence of eﬀort among peers in schools
and in workplaces [(c.f. Sacerdote (2001); Ichino and Falk (2006); Mas and Moretti 2008)].











0 (h,x,hg,x g,m g),θ
0)) +  
θ
g,( 4 )
subject to (3) and to the cultural transmission mechanism.
A parent’s derived preferences over locations, as encapsulated in the optimal value of the above
problem, which exists and is unique given our assumptions, involves a full set of contextual charac-








τ ∈ Θ,w g,r g
¢
to denote contextual characteristics in neighborhood g,a n dX ≡ (h,x,θ) to denote individual char-
acteristics. While Yg is continous, X is a mixed random vector since it contains both continuous and
discrete individual attributes. We also denote with Fa (Y ) and F (X) their (cumulative) distributions,
where a is a larger area that comprises location g, as we describe in detail below. These deﬁnitions
allow us to identify neighborhoods by their respective contextual characteristics and households by
their respective individual characteristics. The value function for problem (4) may then be written
concisely as:
υg ≡ V (Yg;X)+ε(Yg,X),( 5 )
where ε is a random variable. The model implies that if an individual has school-age children, i.e.
α>0, function V (·) is increasing in hg,X g,m g, and φ
θ
g, where θ is own cultural trait.7 On the other
hand, for any value of α, this function is increasing in wg and decreasing in rg.
A household chooses a neighborhood in order to maximize υg.L e to denote a household’s original
location and d its optimal choice of location, destination. A household moves if and only if its
destination diﬀers from its origin, d 6= o. It does not move, if d = o. Looking for a place to live
is subject to frictions. It takes time and eﬀort to ﬁnd out about alternative locations and their
characteristics. We account for frictions by modelling choice of neighborhood as a sequential search
problem. The model allows for alternative locations to be heterogeneous, in the sense that their
characteristics are described as draws from possibly diﬀerent distributions. We adopt a little known
but general model of search due to Weitzman [ Weitzman (1979) ], which allows for heterogeneity
in the distributions of payoﬀs across alternatives.8 We adapt that model’s naturally nested search
strategy to ﬁt the spatial structure of our model.
L e ta na r e a ,i n d e x e db ya,b ed e ﬁn e da sas e to fL distinct but spatially adjacent neighborhoods,
a = {g}
L
g=1. In our empirical implementation, a neighborhood is deﬁned as a census tract. An area a
is described in terms of the cumulative distribution Fa (Y ) for vectors of characteristics, which we have
deﬁned above. Areas are heterogeneous in the sense that Fa (·) 6= Fa0 (·) for a0 6= a. The distribution
functions are known to households, but the characteristics of speciﬁcn e i g h b o r h o o d sw i t h i ne a c ha r e a ,




is maximized when θ
0 = θ, i.e. the child chooses what the parent would have
chosen for her.
8This heterogeneity is reminiscent of the choice of careers versus choice of jobs in Neal (1999).
8Yg, g ∈ a, are realized after searching. The Yg’s, g ∈ a, are independent and identically distributed
draws from Fa; a household visits the neighborhood and samples from Fa (Y ). Search within area a
involves a search cost sa, which may depend on individual characteristics and is incurred once upon
visiting locations within area a. These assumptions capture the intuitive notion that when looking
for a place to live, households have a rough idea of the characteristics of an area but need to invest
resources in order to ﬁnd out about a speciﬁc neighborhood therein.9
If a household does not move, it enjoys utility level, deﬁned by (5) and associated with the origin,
υo. On the other hand, a move from o to d generates mobility costs µ(o,d) > 0, which is possibly
dependent on individual characteristics, and yields υd. Net utility associated with optimally searching




g∈a :[ υg − µ(o,g)]
¾
− sa.
This involves an expectation being taken with respect to the distribution of maximum utility
attainable in area a, net of mobility costs. Let the latter quantity be denoted by W ≡ maxg∈a :
[υg − µ(o,g)]. This quantity is assumed to be distributed in area a according to Ga. This (univariate)
distribution is induced by a household’s utility function, as function of Yg,g i v e nFa(·) and a set of
individual characteristics.
Expected maximum net utility from searching in area a, when the household is at origin o and







WdGa (W) − sa.( 6 )
The household is indiﬀerent between searching and not searching area a if the utility associated
with origin o is equal to the expected maximum net utility of searching within area a. This value,
denoted by e υa, is referred to as reservation utility associated with area a, conditional on individual
characteristics. Using this deﬁnition in (6) above yields






WdGa (W) − sa,
9In practice, how do households accomplish this? We use the metaphor of “visiting” a neighborhood as a description
of a more general process. To start with, walking around a neighborhood or talking to acquaintances or professional
agents provide a lot of information about neighborhood characteristics. The theory of hedonic prices suggests that
people can also make inferences from housing rents and values. Simple hedonic regressions that we present later in the
paper show that rents and values reﬂect key neighborhood characteristics included in Yg in ways that are consistent
with our model. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that households collect information directly and also look at market
prices as indicators of neighborhood quality.
9which may be rewritten in the standard fashion for sequential search problems as:
+∞ Z
e υa
[W − e υa]dGa (W)=sa.( 7 )
The LHS above is monotonically decreasing in reservation utility and satisﬁes limit conditions at the
boundaries of the support of maximum utility attainable by searching area a. Therefore, (7) deﬁnes
reservation utility e υa, which exists and is unique. A household with υo = e υa is indiﬀerent between
searching and not searching area a.
Weitzman (1979) models search among heterogeneous objects as the problem of choosing the
sequence in which to open a number of boxes containing prizes drawn from possibly diﬀerent distribu-
tions. In his model each box contains a single prize. Our adaptation is a straighforward generalization
of this case, whereby a box (an area) contains multiple prizes drawn from the same distribution (neigh-
borhoods). The optimal search strategy is nested: areas are ﬁrst ordered and then neighborhoods
within them are searched. Speciﬁcally, the optimal strategy (referred to in ibid. as Pandora’s Rule)
consists of a selection rule and a stopping rule.
The selection rule is: if an area a is to be searched it should be the one with the highest reservation
utility among those not yet searched. Therefore, a household searches if and only if utility associated
with its origin does not exceed the highest reservation utility across all areas of relevance. This
condition can be expressed for any step in the search process. Speciﬁcally, after n − 1 steps, the nth
area is searched if and only if:
υo ≤ e υn,( 8 )
where e υn is the reservation utility of the nth area in the optimal ranking. If condition (8) is satisﬁed,
the household searches within area n. At this second stage, the order in which locations are visited is
irrelevant and the solution is fully characterized by a reservation utility strategy. It is an implication
of our extension of Weitzman’s model that the reservation utility for searching within an area is the
same as the reservation utility of that area deﬁned for searching among areas, i.e. by (7).10
The stopping rule requires that household i stop when it ﬁnds a location for which realized utility
exceeds the reservation utility of its best alternative as of that point. That is, at the nth step,
conditional on searching, the household moves to destination d, if and only if
υd ≥ e υn.( 9 )
10The proof is straightforward. Suppose that, after (n − 1) steps, household i wants to visit locations within area n.
That is, condition (8) is satisﬁed. The appropriate state variable is utility of origin. The value of searching within area











which implies a reservation utility of exactly e υa.
10This stopping rule completes the description of Pandora’s Rule for a nested search process.11 Let a be
the area where search terminates. This “stopping location” is of course a random variable. It follows
that the probability that a household leave its current location, o, and choose a speciﬁc destination
d, given its individual characteristics, is given by:
pa (o,d)=Prob(υo ≤ e υa,υd ≥ e υa) (10)
Since neighborhoods are identiﬁed by their contextual characteristics, and recalling that υg ≡
V (Yg;X)+ε(Yg,X), this can be interpreted as a transition probability from vector Yo to vector Yd.I t
determines equilibrium ﬂo w sa c r o s sn e i g h b o r h o o d si nag i v e na r e a .R e l y i n go ns u c ha ni n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
transition probabilities may be used to endogenize all contextual characteristics. In particular, rents
will be such that ﬂows across locations satisfy the market clearing condition in the housing market.
It is straightforward to show that such market clearing price exists and is unique in this model under
mild assumptions. As for the remaining contextual characteristics, these are deﬁned as averages of
individual-level attributes at the local level, and so can be computed as expected values of such
attributes, conditional on membership in a particular location.
In sum, an equilibrium in this model is construed as levels of consumption, socialization eﬀort
and study eﬀort, probability distributions governing transitions across neighborhoods, a set of rents
and other neighborhood characteristics so that parents maximize utility given the budget constraint,
children choose their human capital, and the housing market clears.12 Appendix A provides more
details.
4E c o n o m e t r i c s
Our empirical analysis aims at establishing the role of individual and neighborhood attributes as
determinants of individual transition probabilities, as deﬁned by equation (10). We emphasize how
preferences over alternative locations may allow us to make inferences about the role of social in-
teractions. By using deﬁnition (5) in equation (10), and introducing index i to indicate individual
households, we may write the individual transition probability in compact form as
pi,a (o,d)=Fa (Yo,Y d,X i),( 1 1 )
where Fa is the joint cumulative distribution of εi,o−e υi,a and e υi,a−εi,d.I nw r i t i n gFa in this compact
form, we are suggesting that for empirical purposes the vector of individual characteristics, Xi,m a y
be used to control for the individual-speciﬁce ﬀects in the reservation utility of the area, e υi,a.T h e
11See Weitzman (1979) for the proof of optimality.
12Since labor markets are deﬁned at a higher level of aggregation than neighborhoods, the local wage rate is given
with respect to the problem of choosing a location within a larger area.
11latter also depends on the distribution of maximum expected net utility in area a, which renders the
transition probability area-speciﬁc.13 Although reservation utilities are not observable, there is no
reason to believe that they are correlated with area-level means of neighborhood characteristics. The
latter is crucial for our instrumental variable estimation, as we take up in detail below.
Note that we observe only whether or not a household moved and where it moved to, if it did
move, conditional on origin. Nothing about the steps involved in search are observed, unlike problems
typically treated in the standard econometrics of search literature. However, while that literature
is concerned with pinning down reservation utility and the preference structure, we limit ourselves
to inference on the eﬀects of neighborhood attributes on transition probabilities. We appeal to
the optimal search strategy to structure the estimation by considering individual and contextual
characteristics at origin and destination only, as per equation (11).
Estimation of transition probabilities is challenging, because unless the random variables (εi,o −
e υi,a,e υi,a − εi,d) are identical – in which case this probability could be computed as that of ordered
events – generally we need to specify their joint distribution, that is Fa. Since this is unknown, in
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where Φ(·) denotes the standardized cumulative normal distribution. This can be adapted in the
obvious way to express the linear probability model.
T h es i g n so ft h ec o e ﬃcients of pairs of the same contextual variables associated with origin and
with destination, respectively, in the RHS of (12) have intuitively appealing interpretations. Denote
with δ
j ∈ δ the coeﬃcient on the jth neighborhood attribute at origin or destination. If coeﬃcient
δ
j
o ∈ δo is negative (positive), the associated contextual variable, yj
o ∈ Yo, is an attractor (repeller):
larger values decrease (increase) the probability that the household leaves a neighborhood. Similarly,
if a coeﬃcient in δ
j
d ∈ δd is positive (negative), then y
j
d ∈ Yd is an attractor (repeller): larger values
increase (decrease) the probability that the household choose a given neighborhood.
One may wonder why we bother with the theory developed in the previous Section in order to
arrive at such a straightforward econometric model. There are at least two reasons why our theoretical
model is useful. First, although we are not estimating genuinely structural parameters, that is Fa,
our model suggests a structural interpretation of equation (12). Second, the model has a number of
implications we can bring to data and, most important, informs selection of instruments.
4.1 Testable implications
Our theoretical model implies several testable implications. First, it suggests a structural diﬀerence
between households with and without young children. Inspection of (1) and (4) implies that if α =0 ,
13A parametric example we develop in an appendix (available from the authors upon request) suggests that reservation
utility may depend only on the ﬁrst and second moments of such distribution.
12i.e. there are no school-age children living in the household, the value of the process, equation (5),
should not be directly aﬀected by neighborhood attributes that are salient for the acquisition of human
capital by children and in the transmission of own cultural traits to them, as we model them. This
means that households are classiﬁed into one of two distinct regimes, with classiﬁcation possibly being
subject to noise, according to whether there are young children living in the household (regime 1,
where social interactions matter in residential choices), or not (regime 0, where social interactions do
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i ) are random variables, which are assumed to be normally distributed in order to
obtain probit models for the respective events; I[·] is an indicator function that is equal to 1, if α>0,
and to 0, otherwise; k, an unknown parameter; ξ, is a random variable that is normally distributed





i ), respectively. The complementary events for not moving are deﬁn e di nt h eo b v i o u sw a y .
This formulation allows us to write the likelihood of an observation depending upon whether the
regime is known or unknown. If regime switching is exogenous, then the last equation above is not
present in the model.
Denote with Y NE
g ⊂ Yg the subset of contextual variables that we postulate to be associated with














Consider the case in which there are, such regimes. For households in regime 1, we expect variables
associated with “desirable” neighborhood eﬀects, i.e. that may have a positive inﬂuence on chil-
dren’s human capital and enculturation, to behave like attractors. Symmetrically, we expect variables
associated with “undesirable” neighborhood eﬀects to behave like repellers. Formally:
H2 : δ
j
o < 0 and δ
j







o > 0 and δ
j





For households in regime 0, typically single individuals and younger or older couples, ﬂows across
locations should not be aﬀected by the neighborhood eﬀects, since these enter parents’ preferences
only via the welfare of their young children. Formally:











If a certain contextual characteristic is an attractor or a repeller at destination, it should be so at
origin too. Therefore, we expect the coeﬃcients on the same variable at origin and at destination to













,f o ra l lj.
If the parameters we are estimating really reﬂect preferences, then the coeﬃcients on the same









¯ ¯, for all j.
Finally, our theory rests on the assumption that the original location is given at the time a
household chooses a new location. This is so because every child inherits the neighborhood of the
parent, an assumption incorporated in the deﬁnition of transition probabilities, which are deﬁned
conditional on the origin. We discuss this issue further below. Thus, our theory suggests that
contextual eﬀects Yo are exogenous in equation (12):
H7 : Yo is exogenous,
The latter is a testable hypothesis, provided we have valid instruments. We turn to this issue next.
4.2 Choice of instruments
It is the essence of our approach that socioeconomic characteristics of destination neighborhoods are
the outcome of purposeful decision making by their residents, when they did move. This is most easily
seen by recognizing that the object of estimation is actually a system of simultaneous equations.
This is derived from general equilibrium considerations, namely transition equations (12) and the
equations for rents and other neighborhood characteristics. Our model does not suggest identifying
restrictions in such a system. However, it does suggest instruments and so we can estimate transition
equations via instrumental variables.15 These are the area-level contextual characteristics, i.e. the
averages of characteristics in the group of spatially adjacent census tracts that surround the tract
where a household is observed to reside. We justify our choice of instruments as follows. First, our
model suggests that after controlling for individual attributes, only neighborhood characteristics and
reservation utility of an area aﬀect the transition probability, as per equation (10). Therefore, area-
15This also takes care of additional sources of endogeneity, most notably neighborhood unobservables, which are
likely to be relevant due to data limitations. That is, when choosing a speciﬁc Census tract, it is quite plausible that
households sort on unobservable contextual variables.
14level characteristics do not belong to the equation of interest, i.e. are excluded variables. Second, the
characteristics Yg of a tract g within area a, are drawn from the distribution of the respective area
characteristics, Fa (Y ),g∈ a. Hence characteristics at the tract and area levels are at least pairwise
correlated, relative to the universe of all draws across all other areas in the sample.16
Might the candidate instruments be correlated with unobservables in the estimating equation?
This is a concern for two reasons. First, if observables at the tract and area level are correlated, so
too may be unobservables. This may induce correlation between tract-level unobservables and the
instruments. Second, the reservation utility of an area is unobservable, individual-speciﬁc, and aﬀects
the transition probability. This may induce correlation between individual unobservables and the
instruments. We notice the following in defense our choice of instruments.
Relative to the ﬁrst concern, since variables at the tract- and area -level are either pairwise
observable or pairwise unobservable, the possible correlation in question is a cross-correlation. This
is likely to be small if there is enough heterogeneity across tracts in a given area. We get a rough idea
of the level of such heterogeneity by computing pairwise correlations between 30 contextual variables
(including those we use in our estimation) in a given tract and a randomly chosen adjacent tract, across
the 65,443 US Census tracts in 2000. Such correlations should be larger the more homogeneous areas
are. We ﬁnd that they range between 0.10 and 0.70, with the median being 0.47. These magnitudes
suggest that areas are generally not particularly homogeneous population units. The largest values
are associated with race/ethnic shares, mean housing values, rents, and shares of urban population.
It makes sense that areas have instead some degree of homogeneity along those dimensions.
Relative to the second concern, we note that the reservation utility of an area depends on the entire
subjective distribution of maximum utility attainable in that area, and so in principle is independent
of area-level average characteristics.17 Furthermore, individual unobservables that aﬀect evaluation
of an area may be distinct from individual characteristics aﬀecting the decision to move to a speciﬁc
location within that area. For instance, a household may move to a certain area to be closer to
friends and relatives, but where exactly it locates within the area may depend on completely diﬀerent
considerations, unrelated to the presence of friends and relatives in the larger area.
Summarizing, our model suggests the following identifying assumption: although households self-
select endogenously across tracts within speciﬁc areas, area-level mean attributes are unrelated to
unobservables aﬀecting the transition probabilities. This assumption ensures that our instruments
provide the kind of randomization needed to identify causal eﬀects of neighborhood characteristics on
transition probabilities: since the search process proceeds optimally according to the reservation utility
rankings, moving on to search a diﬀerent area implies a diﬀerent set of mean area characteristics for
16This instrumenting strategy is related to the one employed by Bayer et al. (2007), where the unit of observation
is the dwelling unit and information from the 1990 long US Census forms for six counties in the San Francisco Metro
Area is used. The Census data are geocoded down to the Census block level. There are many diﬀerences between their
setting and ours, however, including the important fact that inference in our study rests on individuals’ being observed
over time as they make deliberate moving decisions.
17This is the case if Ga (W) is logistically distributed, as we illustrate in an appendix available upon request.
15reasons that are unrelated to the second stage of search. Therefore, area-level characteristics induce
a random-like variation in the quality of the neighborhoods a household is about to visit, and so in
the probability of moving to a particular location, conditional on origin.
We estimate equation (12) and its linear probability counterpart via instrumental variables. For
the probit model, the instrumental variable estimator for limited dependent variables proposed by
Newey (1987) comes in handy. For the linear case we use the linear instrumental variables estimator.
In both cases we employ a limited information procedure, because we ignore the other simultaneous
equations. However, since our set of instruments provides exact identiﬁcation (each local characteristic
is instrumented by its corresponding area-level average) and we are not interested in cross-equation
restrictions, the only cost is a possible loss in eﬃciency. In particular, our coeﬃcients have general
equilibrium interpretations, in the sense that key variables like prices are allowed to adjust while
contextual characteristics vary. The latter, in turn, move in response to ﬂows of households across
neighborhoods.
5D a t a
Our sample is composed of 6,432 households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We
follow these households for two successive waves, 2001 and 2003. For each household we have detailed
information on personal and neighborhood characteristics in both periods, down to the Census tract
level of disaggregation, thanks to access to conﬁdential geocodes.18 Census tracts are deﬁned by the
US Bureau of the Census as relatively homogeneous units with respect to population characteristics,
economic status, and living conditions. In our sample they average 5,200 inhabitants, with a standard
deviation of 2,450. Therefore, they are a natural choice as a concept of neighborhood.19
We merge individual information with the 2000 Census tract-level data (assuming, of course, that
the population means estimated with the US Census in 2000 approximate well the respective ones
for 2001 and 2003 and making no eﬀort to correct them). We also use Census maps to associate
each tract with area-level information, where an area is deﬁned as a set of Census tracts surrounding
a given tract.20 This way we are able to construct a rich data set containing: (1) individual level
characteristics; (2) contextual variables in the Census tract of origin (2001); (3) contextual variables
in the Census tract of destination (2003); (4) contextual variables in the areas that contain origin and
destination.
18Some of the data used in this analysis are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics, obtained under special contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. These
data are not available from the authors. Persons interested in obtaining PSID Sensitive Data Files should contact
PSIDHelp@isr.umich.edu.
19This is the reason why they have been use so in the past by many researchers. See, in particular, Kremer (1997)
and Weinberg et al. (2004).
20We are deeply grateful to Dr. Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger and the staﬀ of the Tufts GIS Lab for their priceless
help with this step.
16The dependent variable is whether or not a household moved into a tract in 2001 or 2002. We
use as many individual characteristics as controls as appropriate in view of the problem. Contextual
variables ideally should include proxies of the theoretical quantities featured in our model above. Some
of these are intuitively appealing, such as mean educational achievement, mean wage, and mean rent.
W eu s et h ep e r c e n t a g eo ft h el o c a lp o p u l a t i o nb e l o wt h ep o v e r t yl i n ea sarelative measure of how
aﬄuent a community is. We include the following two variables, percentage of children aged 5—17
who do not speak English well, and percentage of children aged 5—17 who are not enrolled in school,
in order to capture the eﬀect of peers’ characteristics on choice of study eﬀort. Clearly, children in
that age range can be regarded as likely peers of the children of families in regime 1. Measures of
racial and ethnic composition of tracts as well as their variation over time are constructed as follows.
Each household is assigned to a race or ethnic group, as deﬁned by the US Census, if either head or
spouse belong to that group. The groups are: White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, Hispanic,
A s i a n ,a n dO t h e r . W i t he a c hh o u s e h o l di nt h es a m p l ew ea s s o c i a t et h ep e r c e n t a g eo fp o p u l a t i o n
in its tract belonging to the same race/ethnic group, as well as the percentage of population in the
same race/ethnic group that moved into the tract within the past ﬁve years. We use the percentage
of population, independently of race or ethnicity, who moved into the neighborhood within the past
ﬁve years as a measure of neighborhood stability. We use county-level mean wage as a labor-market
control, because counties deﬁne local labor markets reasonably well for most of the US. An important
variable we wish to control for but is unavailable at the Census tract level is the crime rate. The
best we can do is to use FBI data (Uniform Crime Report) at the county level, the lowest level of
disaggregation at which crime data are released on a national scale. We use the number of violent
and property crimes per 100,000 inhabitants for 2000.
Table 2 lists the variables used in our estimations. Tables 3 to 5 report summary statistics21,
with Table 3 reporting statistics for the whole sample, Table 4 separately for households without and
with children below 18 years of age in 2003 (these are, respectively 3,513 and 2,919), and Table 5
separately for non-movers and movers. These statistics show that movers between January 1st 2001
and day of interview in 2003 comprise 26.2% of the sample.22 This is quite consistent with CPS data,
according to which 13.3% of American households moved in 2004. There are no substantial diﬀerences
in moving rates across the two types of households. Furthermore, young, unmarried, well-educated,
non-homeowning, short-tenure, relatively low-income and low-wealth individuals or households are
more likely to be movers, as one would expect. Of those who moved in our sample, 18% moved across
states (this ﬁgure is 19% in the CPS), 41% across counties (42% in the CPS), and 70% across census
21All summary statistics are weighted, using PSID-provided weights, to represent the entire the US population.
22Two data issues arise when constructing the dependent variable. First, 260 households (4% of the sample) report
in 2003 that they did not move in the above period, but report living in a Census tract that is diﬀerent from that of
day of interview in 2001. We treat this as misreporting and classify these 260 households as movers. On the other
hand, 621 households (9.7% of the sample) report in 2003 that they had moved but are found in the same location as
in 2001. This is either misreporting or that households in question moved within Census tracts. Since we are interested
in moves across Census tracts, these households are reclassiﬁed as non-movers. With these adjustments, movers across
Census tracts comprise 24.3% of the sample.
17tracts. It is comforting that diﬀerences with the CPS ﬁgures are small.
Table 6 reports the results from conventional linear hedonic regressions of rents and house values
on the contextual characteristics at the Census tract level summarized in Table 2b. These demonstrate
that rents and values convey diﬀerent information about tracts, short- and long-run, respectively. We
carry out estimation using the universe of 65,443 Census tracts in the US. Rents appear to reﬂect the
education of residents, linguistic skills of children and the poverty rate in the direction predicted by
our model.23 Therefore, such prices may be used by households in their evaluation of neighborhoods.
House values, on the other hand, seem to reﬂe c ts o m ec o n t e x t u a lc h a r a c t e r i s t i c si nw a y st h a ta r e
consistent with intuition only if expectations are important.24
6 Results
We estimate a switching regression model under the assumption that the two regimes we have de-
scribed above are exogenously identiﬁed by whether or no there are young children (deﬁned as children
below 18 years old) living in the household at the time the household moved to a new destination —
2003 in this case. In this way, we allow that young parents without children in 2001 may anticipate
having children, as well as older parents who have children living with them in 2001, though not
in 2003, to make residential choices in transition from one regime to the other. We report below
frequencies of moves (and actual magnitudes in parentheses) according to whether or not there are
y o u n gc h i l d r e nl i v i n gi nt h eh o u s e h o l di n2 0 0 1a n d2 0 0 3 .
Households that switch across regimes are those without young children in 2001 but with young
children in 2003 (young switchers) and those with young children in 2001 but without in 2003 (older
switchers). These switchers have higher moving rates than the rest of the population. If we deﬁne
the relative propensity to move as the ratio between the concentration of a certain type of household
among movers and in the population, then young switchers have a propensity to move (1.75) that is
almost twice the propensity of the rest of the population (0.94). The propensity of older switchers is
a bit lower (1.27) but still higher than non switchers. Clearly, something happens at the boundary
between these regimes with respect to relocation choices, which strengthens our conﬁdence that they
are deﬁned meaningfully for the problem under study.
23The eﬀect of the ethnic composition of the neighborhood has no immediate interpretation, because it is valued
diﬀerently by people belonging to diﬀerent demographic groups.
24There are a number of descriptive statistics and other data features that are not directly related to the problem
under study, but are of great interest given the way we combine individual and contextual information at diﬀerent
points in time. We report and discuss these statistics, which are part of a broader research project, in the Appendix
available from the authors upon request.
18with children in 2003 w/out children in 2003
with children in 2001 22% (705 out of 3136) 42% (109 out of 260)
w/out children in 2001 31% (116 out of 377) 24% (630 out of 2659)
In the case of exogenous regimes, a switching regression is equivalent to carrying out separate
regressions with the respective two sub-samples and then testing for equality of coeﬃcients across
equations, i.e. H1 above (see Quandt, 1972). It would have been desirable to report estimations with
endogenous switching, but this is complicated by the large number of endogenous variables in the
outcome equation. Therefore, we rely on the regimes implied by our model. This helps keep the
estimation simple, by avoiding parametric assumptions and possible computational pitfalls.
As we illustrated above, we use as instruments the averages of characteristics within a tract’s area,
that is the group of spatially adjacent census tracts. The meta-area characteristics we include in our
analysis, i.e. crime rates and wages, are deﬁned at the county level and so are constant within each
area. Therefore, we treat them as exogenous variables in the empirical analysis, consistently with the
fact that in our model households do not choose areas directly. The model implies that we should
only instrument characteristics at destination, because a household’s original location is given. The
implication that characteristics at origin are exogenous, hypothesis H7, is testable. Also testing for
exogeneity of characteristics at destination provides a benchmark. Using a Hausman test and based
on our set of instruments we reject exogeneity of the contextual variables, listed in Table 2, that are
associated with the destination tract (2003 variables), but do not reject exogeneity of those at origin
(2001 variables). In both instances, there is a fairly high degree of conﬁdence, as we report below.25
This is evidence in favor of H7.
Testing H7 : Exogeneity of origin and destination
Linear probability model
Hypothesis: Yo exogenous Yd exogenous
F(15,4808) 0.94 2.98
P-value 0.52 0.00
Reject at 5%? no yes
25Note that in spite of more than 6,000 observations, the F-statistic is based on 15 and only 4,808 degrees of
freedom because in all of the regressions we run standard errors are robust to intra-tract correlations, and our sample
is distributed across 4,809 combinations of census tracts in 2001 and 2003. We used regression-based versions of the
Hausman test: for the F test in conjunction with the linear probability model, we use predicted values at the ﬁrst
stage; for the probit model, we instead use residuals from ﬁrst-stage of the Newey (1987) estimator, in order to adapt
the test due to Smith and Blundell (1986) in the context of our model.
19Probit model
Hypothesis: Yo exogenous Yd exogenous
χ2(15) 13.65 34.18
P-value 0.55 0.00
Reject at 5%? no yes
The outcome of this test may be puzzling, because in reality households move more than once,
so that origin was itself the outcome of purposeful choice earlier. This outcome should not be so
surprising, because life conditions and neighborhood characteristics may be subject to rapid changes.
The endogeneity of contextual variables is due to the sorting process itself, so that these reﬂect
household preferences over neighborhood characteristics, though as of the time of the move.W eo ﬀer
the following thoughts on this.
First, for many individuals in our sample who are young, original locations are exogenous, e.g.
due to their having been strongly inﬂuenced by others, possibly by parents. Or, they may have been
chosen when those individuals were subject to constraints (such as being in graduate school, having
no children, etc.). Changes in these factors prompt a move.
Second, neighborhoods themselves change in terms of their social composition. In some cases they
change quite rapidly, as documented, for instance, by the ﬁeld work of Wilson and Taub (2006). An
eﬀective way to assess how fast neighborhoods change is to compare data from two successive censuses,
at the tract level. Speciﬁcally, we generated (but do not report here) maps that document the change
in the poverty rate — an important contextual eﬀect in our work — at the tract level in a number
of major US urban areas, from 1990 to 2000.26 Such maps show that in most cases neighborhoods
experienced major changes, with the poverty rate that increases or decreases by up to 20% or more.
Summarizing, we interpret the outcome of the exogeneity test as follows: even if original locations
may indeed have been chosen in the past based on individual characteristics and contextual variables,
changes in own characteristics and neighborhood dynamics may have rendered them exogenous over
time, relative to current individual characteristics and neighborhood circumstances.
We estimate equation (12) and its linear probability counterpart by instrumenting for tract-level
characteristics at destination. Our main results are reported in Table 7. An extract of Table 7 con-
taining only signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of particular interest and basic diagnostics follows immediately
below for convenience. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity as well as spatial corre-
lation within Census tracts in 2001 and 2003. We ﬁnd that key contextual variables associated with
neighborhood eﬀects in our model – such as linguistic skills of peers, poverty rate, neighborhood
stability and “adverse” variation of its ethnic composition – aﬀect signiﬁcantly, and in the directions
predicted by our theory, the transition probability for households with school-age children, but not
26These maps were generated using the interactive website maintained by The Bruton Center at the University of
Texas at Dallas: http://www.urbanpoverty.net/
20for those without children. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the percentage of kids aged 5 to 17 who do not
speak English well acts as a repeller for families of the ﬁr s tt y p e ,b u th a sn oe ﬀect on the other type.
The same is true for the fraction of population below the poverty threshold. These two eﬀects are
consistent with the implications of the theoretical model in the presence of neighborhood eﬀects in the
production of human capital. Similarly, while the eﬀect of the percentage of neighborhood population
that belongs to one’s own race/ethnic group is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, its change, that
is the associated percentage of those who recently (i.e. during the past ﬁve years) moved into the
neighborhood, is an attractor for households with kids, and has no eﬀect on others. This result, too,
is consistent with the implications of the theoretical model in the presence of neighborhood eﬀects in
the transmission of cultural traits.
A notable explanatory variable that acts as a repeller for families with kids is neighborhood
instability, as measured by the percentage of individuals who recently moved into the neighborhood.
Instability at origin encourages moving out and at destination encourages moving in. This is also
consistent with the ﬁeld evidence analyzed by Wilson and Taub (2006). The percentage of those who
recently moved into a neighborhood, while a particularly interesting variable in its own right, is also
the lagged value of the neighborhood aggregate transition probability.
When neighborhoods are in stationary equilibrium, the percentage of individuals moving into a
given neighborhood during a certain length of time is equal to those moving out over the same length
of time. This suggests that we may face the “reﬂection problem” [Manski (1993)] if we were to measure
neighborhood stability with the percentage of population who recently moved into the neighborhood
in the linear probability model and use the neighborhood means of individual eﬀects as contextual
eﬀects. In that case, one may not identify separately endogenous social interactions in mobility
decisions and contextual eﬀects. This is not a source of concern here for the following reasons. First,
like for all other tract-level variables, we are instrumenting our measure of neighborhood stability.
Second, our dependent variable, that is whether a household moved in 2001 or 2002, refers to the time
interval 2000—2002, while the percentage of those who recently moved into the neighborhood refers
to 1995—1999, a diﬀerent data source. It should not imply that the means of the two are linearly
related. The reﬂection problem would arise when the exact same data are used to measure individual
and tract-level variables.
21Extract of Table 7: Main Results
Linear IV IV Probit
w/out kids w/kids w/out kids w/kids marginal
Human capital:
poor English ’01 0.99 4.17** 3.99 15.74** 1.59 6.28
[1.11] [1.43] [3.98] [5.64]
poor English ’03 -1.81 -5.11** -7.42 -19.60** -2.96 -7.82
[1.39] [1.69] [5.13] [6.82]
poverty ’01 0.50 1.24* 2.05 4.09* 0.81 1.61
[0.44] [0.59] [1.46] [1.96]
poverty ’03 -0.65 -1.58* -2.68 -5.24* -1.06 -2.07
[0.53] [0.71] [1.79] [2.45]
Culture:
own race in ’01 0.08 -1.17** 0.64 -3.48* 0.23 -1.25
[0.41] [0.38] [1.42] [1.36]
own race in ’03 -0.04 1.40** -0.5 4.46** -0.18 1.60
[0.44] [0.41] [1.61] [1.55]
Stability:
all in ’01 0.05 2.74* -0.27 8.04* -0.11 3.15
[1.17] [1.12] [3.90] [3.86]
all in ’03 0.19 -2.74* 1.39 -7.94 0.55 -3.12
[1.31] [1.25] [4.56] [4.47]
Observations 3360 2805 3360 2805
Correct predict.:
All 78.1% 78.5% 78.2% 77.6%
Movers 38.4% 41.9% 40.4% 43.7%
Nonmovers 90.1% 90.9% 89.7% 89.1%
Robust standard errors in brackets
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
22Is the diﬀerence between the two household types signiﬁcant with respect to neighborhood eﬀects,
i.e. can we reject H1 and existence of two diﬀerent regimes, as suggested by our model? We report
below the result of test on the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant27 are equal across
regimes at origin, destination, and both. This is a test on the hypothesis that households with and
without young children care equally about neighborhood characteristics and so, possibly, about social
interactions.28 The null is rejected comfortably both in the linear and the nonlinear models.



















F 3.92 3.52 3.08
d.o.f. (4 , 4696) (4 , 4696) (8 , 4696)
P-value : 0.004 0.007 0.002



















χ2 13.41 11.30 18.92
d.o.f. 4 4 8
P-value : 0.009 0.023 0.015
Reject at 5%? yes yes yes
The results summarized in Table 7 provide evidence in favor of all of remaining hypotheses, i.e.
H2 to H6, with some caveats. H2, i.e. that variables associated with “desirable” neighborhood
eﬀects are attractors for households with school-age children, implies that neighborhood education
and the percentage of children in school age (5-17) not enrolled in school should aﬀect signiﬁcantly
transition probabilities. This is not the case. Furthermore, those contextual variables have the
“wrong” sign. A possible interpretation is that, on the one hand, neighborhood education – assuming
27Insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are trivially equal across models.
28The test is based on combining the equations of the two regimes in a single equation, e.g. in the linear model:
pi,a (o,d)=X0
iβ + Y 0
oδo + Y 0
dδd + Y 0
oe δoI[α>0] + Y 0
de δdI[α>0] + ei,o,d,
which indicates that the case of no regimes is equivalent to e δo =0and e δd =0 . This implicitly assumes that unobserv-
ables in the two regimes are identically distributed. This is admittedly a strong assumption, but one that simpliﬁes
testing considerably. For the linear probability model, this is equivalent to a Chow, that is, an F test. For the pro-
bit model with instrumental variables, the test is a χ2, consistently with the Newey’s (1987) minimum chi-squared
estimator we employ.
23there are no unobservable barriers to mobility – is not perceived to be an important determinant of
children’s human capital by parents, after conditioning on their own education and other neighborhood
attributes. On the other hand, the percentage of peers who are not enrolled in school might not be
a good proxy for peer eﬀects. For example, such children, who constitute only 2% of the total, may
be educated through home-schooling or they may be just too few to be a source of concern. It is
puzzling that this variable is actually signiﬁcant for households without young children, although not
in the direction we would expect for the other type of households. It is possible that the percentage
of potential peers not enrolled in school, while a meaningful measure of peer eﬀects, may be proxying
for something else, an issue to which we return below. Furthermore, both violent and property
crime have no explanatory power. We interpret this negative ﬁnding as the eﬀect of aggregation:
what matters may be crime at the neighborhood level, but such data are not available. Our lack of
spatially more detailed information about crime and about local amenities that may attract diﬀerent
types of households is, in principle, a source of concern. We believe this problem is mitigated by the
inclusion of rents and house values in our regression. As we showed above, such prices proxy for the
attraction of neighborhood attributes, and so it is reasonable to believe that they control for some of
the unobservables that aﬀect transition probabilities.
A related issue is the possibility that the variables we use as measures of neighborhood eﬀects
actually proxy for unobservables that aﬀect decisions of households. We believe the evidence that
households with and without children in school age belong to diﬀerent regimes with respect to these
variables makes a compelling case for interpreting our ﬁndings in terms of preferences for social
interactions. Furthermore, it is again reasonable to believe that the variability of unobservable char-
acteristics people care about at the neighborhood level are already reﬂected in the variability of prices
in the housing market, which we control for.
6.1 Diagnostics and checks
A number of issues that are highlighted by our diagnostics deserve additional discussion. Identiﬁcation
is not a concern: the ﬁrst-stage partial correlation between any endogenous tract-level variable and the
corresponding area-level instrument is relatively large and highly signiﬁcant.29 Formally, a likelihood
ratio test allows us to reject the hypothesis that — relative to our instruments — the rank condition is
not satisﬁed. For the same reason, we are not worried about weak-instruments.30
Our models have good predictive power, despite the limited number of statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients: we predict correctly almost 80% of choices in the sample. The prediction rate is much
higher for non-movers, about 90%, than for movers, about 40%. More about this asymmetry is
revealed by analyzing residuals from the model, which we turn to next.
29These are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.
30We cannot establish this formally because the tabulations of the critical values for the Stock and Yogo (2005) test
for weak instruments are available only for up to two endogenous regressors (whereas we have ﬁfteen regressors). The
reason is that they are computationally very demanding.
24For brevity, we only consider the residuals from the linear model. Figure 1 shows that the residuals
are clearly bimodal, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between households without and with children. The
source of such bimodality is revealed by Figure 2: residuals are small and negative on average for
non-movers, and large for movers. This suggests that we may be missing important factors that
prompt moves. For instance, it could be that movers are subject to particular forces, such as family
demographics for the young, and a greater concentration around retirement time for older households,
as people make relocation decisions, that are very pronounced. Althoughw eu s em a n yi n d i v i d u a l
controls, there could still be omitted variables.
However, there is another, mechanical explanation for this pattern. The lower residuals for non-
movers may just be an artifact of the implication summarized in hypotheses H5 and H6, and a modeling
convention, namely that contextual variables at the origin coincide with those at the destination, for
non-movers. Residuals in the linear model are simply:
b ei,o,d = mi − X
0
ib β − Y
0
ob δo − Y
0
db δd,
where mi is the mobility indicator. Under H5 and H6 this equation becomes:
b ei,o,d = mi − X
0
ib β +( Yd − Yo)
0 b δ.
The last term on the RHS is zero for non-movers, for whom Yd = Yo. However, it must be positive for
movers if they choose neighborhoods to improve their welfare, because that term can be interpreted as
the measured component of utility gain from the destination relative to the origin. As a consequence,
the residuals for movers are larger than those for non-movers. This suggests that the behavior of
residuals in our model is not necessarily evidence of misspeciﬁcation.
Next we examine the bias associated with OLS estimates in the presence of endogenous explanatory
variables by focusing on the linear case and by comparing our linear IV results with OLS. The linear
probability model we estimated has the following form: mi = X0
iβ+Y 0
oδo + Y 0
dδd + ei,o,d,w h e r eei,o,d
is unobservable, and possibly correlated with Yd. We can use residual regression to get separate
estimates of δo and δd. Deﬁne δ ≡ (δo δd)
0 and Y ≡ (Yo Yd)
0 . If our instruments are valid, so that the
probability limit of the IV estimator is the true parameter, then
δOLS
p









where e Y denotes the residuals from the regression of contextual on individual characteristics, V(e Y ) is
the variance-covariance matrix of contextual characteristics at origin and destination, and C(e Y,e o,d)
is the row vector of covariances between the error term and contextual characteristics – the ﬁrst half
of this vector of course contains only zeros because Yo is exogenous.
It is hard to predict a priori the sign of the inconsistency of the OLS estimator, because this
depends in a complicated way on the covariances between contextual characteristics. However, we
25can always obtain a numerical answer from our sample. Table 9 shows that the OLS coeﬃcients on
contextual variables of particular interest are smaller in absolute value than the IV ones (when these
are signiﬁcant). That is, OLS systematically underestimates the eﬀect of neighborhood characteristics
on transition probabilities. This is consistent with a central tenet of our approach, namely that it is
precisely self-selection into neighborhoods that helps reveal preferences for social interactions. Were
we to treat characteristics at destination as exogenous instead of objects of purposeful choice, we
would systematically underestimate the eﬀect of neighborhood characteristics associated with social
interactions on residential choices.
Finally, in order to gain additional insight into our instrumental variables strategy, we augmented
our data set with county-level contextual eﬀects. This gives us three diﬀerent hierarchical levels of
aggregation: tracts, areas, and counties. We re-estimate our main model using county-level variables
as instruments instead of area-level ones. Of all the contextual eﬀects that are signiﬁcant in the basic
model, only poverty – both at origin and destination – survives with these diﬀerent instruments.
The reason is intuitive: the correlation between contextual characteristics at the tract and a more
aggregate level becomes weaker as one moves to higher levels of aggregation. Furthermore, the
higher the level of aggregation at which instruments are deﬁned, the less variation they provide.
As a consequence, county-level instrumental variables produce more noisy estimates. Next, while
still instrumenting tract-level characteristics with their county-level counterparts, we include area-
level variables as exogenous explanatory variables. These should have no explanatory power if it is
appropriate to treat them as excluded exogenous variables. It turns out that this is in fact the case.
However, this is likely to be an artifact of the relatively high correlation between tract- and area-level
variables, which tends to increase standard errors. In fact, in this second model even “poverty” loses
its signiﬁcance.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper reports estimates of preferences for neighborhood characteristics, as revealed by house-
holds’ residential choices. We embed our approach in a formal search model and ﬁnd support for
a central implication of theories of neighborhood eﬀects, namely households move to locations that
provide, from their viewpoint, better social interactions for children. This is not, of course, direct
evidence in support of neighborhood eﬀects. Our conclusion is weaker, yet sharp: the residential
choices of US families with young children living with them are partly driven by the belief that social
interactions, as measured here, matter.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix we show how transition probabilities deﬁn e di n( 1 0 )c a nb eu s e dt oc l o s et h em o d e l .N o t i c eﬁrst
that since they determine equilibrium ﬂows across neighborhoods in a given area, transition probabilities must satisfy
the following property, where for notational simplicity here and in what follows we don’t make the multiple character
of integration explicit:
R
pa (o,d)dYd =1 , d ∈ a
That is, conditional on the area where search terminates and for a given origin and a set of individual characteristics,
the transition probability must integrate to one with respect to characteristics at destination. In other words, a
households must end up somewhere, including its original location. In view of this interpretation, transition probabilities
may be used to confer properties of endogeneity on contextual characteristics. For any neighborhood g ∈ a, pa (g,g) is
the probability that, conditional on individual characteristics, the household stays, and 1 − pa (g,g) is the probability
that it moves out. It is intuitively clear that the “sum” of the probabilities that individuals move can be interpreted
as the expected number of movers. To compute the expected number of out-movers, it suﬃces to integrate over the
probability that a household move out with respect to the distribution of individual characteristics (some of which may
be discrete-valued). This yields the expected outﬂow from neighborhood g as a function of local characteristics, O(Yg):
O(Yg)=
R
(1 − pa (g,g))dF (X).
29Similarly, for any two neighborhoods g ∈ a and γ 6= g, pa (γ,g) is the probability that a household moves to
neighborhood g from some original neighborhood γ. Integrating such probability with respect to the distribution of
individual characteristics and with respect to contextual characteristics in the original locations yields the expected
number of in-movers to location g. We call this the expected inﬂow to neighborhood g. This is also a function of





If the number of housing units and the vacancy rate are approximately constant, then at an equilibrium in which
the housing market in location g clears we have:
I (Yg) − O(Yg)=0 .
The properties of the value function (5) suggests that the expected outﬂow and inﬂow are, respectively, increasing
and decreasing in rg, the price of housing services in neighborhood g. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a market-clearing rent level in every neighborhood. This depends on all remaining contextual characteristics
in the neighborhood. Finally, most of these are deﬁned as averages of individual-level variables at the local level. Notice
that the probability that a household with given individual characteristics is a member of neighborhood g is given by
the probability of moving to such neighborhood from any possible original location, that is:
R
pa (γ,g)dYγ.
Such membership probability can be used to construct expectations of contextual characteristics, by weighting






Here, e Y g denotes the subset of Yg composed of average characteristics of residents. The ﬁx e dp o i n t so ft h i ss y s t e m
of equations, together with equilibrium prices and variables such as wages which are determined at a higher level of
aggregation that the neighborhood, form the equilibrium vector of contextual characteristics.31
31We cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria. This aspect of the problem goes beyond the goal of the
paper, so we assume that the equilibrium is unique.
30Table 1: Reasons why people moved within the US in 2004
(Source: authors’ tabulation from the Current Population Survey)
Reason why moved Share of movers
Family:
Changed marital status 6.2%
To establish own household 7.0%
Other family reason 11.2%
24.4%
Work:
New job or job transfer 9.2%
To look for work or lost job 2.4%
To be closer to work 3.7%
Retired 0.3%
Other work reason 1.4%
17.0%
Housing and Neighborhood:
Wanted own home, not rent 9.3%
Wanted new or better home 21.1%
Wanted better neighborhood 4.7%
Wanted cheaper housing 7.3%
Other housing reason 10.3%
52.7%
Other:
To attend or leave college 2.9%




31Table 2a. Individual controls
age age
HWblack whether head or wife has African-American ancestry
HWhisp whether head or wife has Hispanic ancestry
HWwhite whether head or wife has White non Hispanic and non Asian ancestry
Hwprotestant whether head or wife is protestant
HWcatholic whether head or wife is catholic
HWjewish whether head or wife is Jewish
HWother whether head or wife practice another religion
northeast whether head grew up in the Northeastern
northcentral whether head grew up in the Midwest
south whether head grew up in the South
foreign whether head grew up outside the US
alcohol01 whether head or wife drink alcohol
military01 whether head or wife served in the army
dkids variation in number of kids between 2001 and 2003
nevermarried01 whether head never married, as of 2001
widowed01 whether head is widowed in 2001
divorced01 whether head is divorced in 2001
separated01 whether head is separated in 2001
dstatus whether head changed marital status between 2001 and 2003
dropout whether head or wife are school dropout
highschool whether head or wife are high school graduates
collegemore whether head or wife are at least college graduates
unemp01 whether head or wife are were unemployed in 2001
Hselfemp01 whether head is self-employed
Hretired01 whether head was retired in 2001
Hunion01 whether head belongs to union
tenuretot cumulative tenure (in years) of head and wife
newjob whether head or wife have a discontinuity in job tenure
dhealth whether head of wife health status changed between 2001 and 2003
owner01 whether household owns home
income01 total family income (2001 dollars, thousands)
income increase income increase between 2001 and 2003 (2001 dollars, thousands)
incomedecrease income decrease between 2001 and 2003 (2001 dollars, thousands)
wealth01 total family wealth, not including value of house (2001 dollars, thousands)
debts01 whether family has ﬁnancial debts
appliedwelfare01 whether household applied for welfare in 2001
foodstamps01 whether household received food stamps in 2001
powercouple whether both head and wife have college degree or more
32Table 2b. Contextual controls
1. Housing market
vacancy % housing units not occupied
medvalue median value of houses(2001 dollars, thousands)
medrent median rent (2001 dollars, thousands)
medrent*renter interaction of median rent and renter status
medvalue*owner interaction of median house value and owner status
2. Labor market
urban % population in urban areas
meanwage county-level mean wage (2001 dollars, thousands)
3. Social interactions in human capital
hsdropout18 % school-dropout (18 years or older)
hsdegree18 % with high school degree (18 years or older)
collegemore18 % with college degree or more (18 years or older)
nogoodeng517 % with not good ﬂuency in English (5 to 17 years old)
notenrolled1017 % kids in age 10-17 not enrolled in school
poverty % individuals below poverty threshold
4. Social interactions in cultural transmission
ownrace % of population in same race/ethnicity as household
ownrace_in % of same race/ethnicity that moved in between 1995 and 1999
5. Neighborhood stability
all_in % of population that moved in between 1995 and 1999
6. Crime
violent county-level violent crimes per 100,000 citizens
property county-level property crimes per 100,000 citizens
33Table 3. Summary Statistics, whole sample
Mean Std. Dev min max
moved 0.22 0.41 0 1
age 49.34 16.32 18 97
HWblack 0.12 0.33 0 1
HWhisp 0.06 0.23 0 1
HWwhite 0.79 0.41 0 1
HWprotestant 0.62 0.49 0 1
HWcatholic 0.29 0.45 0 1
HWjewish 0.04 0.20 0 1
HWother 0.02 0.12 0 1
northeast 0.21 0.41 0 1
northcentral 0.25 0.44 0 1
south 0.28 0.45 0 1
foreign 0.08 0.27 0 1
alcohol01 0.69 0.46 0 1
military01 0.03 0.16 0 1
dkids -0.01 0.50 -4 5
nevermarried01 0.19 0.40 0 1
widowed01 0.09 0.29 0 1
divorced01 0.16 0.37 0 1
separated01 0.03 0.16 0 1
dstatus 0.06 0.23 0 1
dropout 0.87 0.34 0 1
highschool 0.17 0.37 0 1
collegemore 0.27 0.44 0 1
unemp01 0.05 0.21 0 1
Hselfemp01 0.10 0.30 0 1
Hretired01 0.20 0.40 0 1
Hunion01 0.10 0.30 0 1
tenuretot 7.69 10.68 0 67
newjob 0.23 0.42 0 1
dhealth 0.54 0.50 0 1
owner01 0.66 0.47 0 1
income01 66.31 86.37 -59.95 2,112.30
incomeincrease 12.53 57.42 0 3,056.37
incomedecrease 12.99 57.67 0 1,595.78
wealth01 190.71 943.66 -386.50 42,208.00
debts01 0.51 0.50 0 1
34Table 3, continued.
Mean Std. Dev min max
appliedwelfare01 0.01 0.12 0 1
foodstamps01 0.04 0.20 0 1
powercouple 0.06 0.23 0 1
vacancy_01 0.54 0.27 0 1
vacancy_03 0.53 0.27 0 1
medrent_01 0.65 0.26 0 2.00
medrent_03 0.65 0.27 0 2.00
medvalue_01 140.62 101.84 0 1,000.00
medvalue_03 141.32 102.84 0 1,000.00
urban_01 0.79 0.35 0 1
urban_03 0.79 0.36 0 1
meanwage_01 33.98 7.44 16.51 63.16
meanwage_03 33.94 7.41 17.12 63.16
hsdropout18_01 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.77
hsdropout18_03 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.75
hsdegree18_01 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.57
hsdegree18_03 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.60
collegemore18_01 0.29 0.17 0 0.85
collegemore18_03 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.85
notenrolled517_01 0.03 0.03 0 0.35
notenrolled517_03 0.03 0.03 0 0.41
nogoodenglish517_01 0.02 0.04 0 0.53
nogoodenglish517_03 0.02 0.03 0 0.53
poverty_01 0.12 0.10 0 0.91
poverty_03 0.12 0.10 0 0.72
ownrace_01 0.75 0.27 0 1
ownrace_03 0.75 0.27 0 1
ownrace_in_01 0.45 0.16 0 1
ownrace_in_03 0.45 0.16 0 1
all_in_01 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.39
all_in_03 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.39
violent_01 481.68 352.11 0 2,465.60
violent_03 483.69 356.14 0 2,465.60
property_01 3,505.94 1,660.17 17.5 12,268.30
property_03 3,508.86 1,665.03 17.5 12,268.30
35Table 4. Summary Statistics, w/out children vs. w/children
w/out children w/children
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
moved 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42
age 54.22 16.84 39.50 9.32
HWblack 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.35
HWhisp 0.03 0.17 0.11 0.31
HWwhite 0.83 0.38 0.72 0.45
HWprotestant 0.63 0.48 0.61 0.49
HWcatholic 0.26 0.44 0.35 0.48
HWjewish 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
HWother 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13
northeast 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
northcentral 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
south 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44
foreign 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.33
alcohol01 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45
military01 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19
dkids -0.07 0.32 0.11 0.72
nevermarried01 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.34
widowed01 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.13
divorced01 0.19 0.39 0.11 0.31
separated01 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.18
dstatus 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23
dropout 0.88 0.33 0.85 0.36
highschool 0.15 0.35 0.21 0.41
collegemore 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46
unemp01 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24
Hselfemp01 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32
Hretired01 0.29 0.45 0.02 0.13
Hunion01 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33
tenuretot 7.36 11.15 8.35 9.64
newjob 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45
dhealth 0.63 0.48 0.35 0.48
owner01 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.47
income01 61.25 79.26 76.51 98.40
incomeincrease 11.62 62.63 14.38 45.05
incomedecrease 13.00 57.06 12.98 58.89
wealth01 218.36 852.95 134.96 1,102.25
36Table 4, continued.
w/out children w/children
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
debts01 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.49
appliedwelfare01 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15
foodstamps01 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26
powercouple 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.28
vacancy_01 0.53 0.27 0.55 0.27
vacancy_03 0.53 0.27 0.55 0.27
medrent_01 0.65 0.26 0.66 0.26
medrent_03 0.65 0.26 0.66 0.27
medvalue_01 141.45 102.42 138.94 100.69
medvalue_03 141.83 102.68 140.30 103.17
urban_01 0.79 0.36 0.80 0.35
urban_03 0.78 0.36 0.79 0.36
meanwage_01 33.69 7.31 34.55 7.66
meanwage_03 33.66 7.29 34.51 7.62
hsdropout18_01 0.19 0.12 0.21 0.14
hsdropout18_03 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.14
hsdegree18_01 0.29 0.10 0.28 0.10
hsdegree18_03 0.29 0.10 0.28 0.10
collegemore18_01 0.30 0.17 0.29 0.17
collegemore18_03 0.30 0.17 0.29 0.17
notenrolled517_01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
notenrolled517_03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
nogoodenglish517_01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
nogoodenglish517_03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
poverty_01 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11
poverty_03 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11
ownrace_01 0.75 0.26 0.74 0.27
ownrace_03 0.75 0.26 0.74 0.27
ownrace_in_01 0.44 0.15 0.46 0.17
ownrace_in_03 0.44 0.15 0.46 0.18
all_in_01 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.05
all_in_03 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.05
violent_01 479.44 356.91 486.21 342.23
violent_03 484.21 364.36 482.65 339.02
property_01 3,481.24 1,667.88 3,555.96 1,643.78
property_03 3,498.16 1,682.87 3,530.48 1,628.60
37Table 5. Summary Statistics, Non-movers vs. movers
Stayers Movers
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
moved 0 0 1 0
age 51.43 15.77 41.85 16.06
HWblack 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36
HWhisp 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21
HWwhite 0.80 0.40 0.78 0.42
HWprotestant 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49
HWcatholic 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43
HWjewish 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.17
HWother 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16
northeast 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.37
northcentral 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45
south 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46
foreign 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24
alcohol01 0.68 0.47 0.71 0.45
military01 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20
dkids -0.03 0.46 0.05 0.61
nevermarried01 0.15 0.36 0.34 0.47
widowed01 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25
divorced01 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37
separated01 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19
dstatus 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.30
dropout 0.89 0.31 0.77 0.42
highschool 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.44
collegemore 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.47
unemp01 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.26
Hselfemp01 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.28
Hretired01 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.31
Hunion01 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28
tenuretot 8.48 11.18 4.87 8.08
newjob 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44
dhealth 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.48
owner01 0.75 0.43 0.35 0.48
income01 69.90 91.26 53.49 64.46
incomeincrease 12.07 60.16 14.17 46.32
incomedecrease 13.92 63.35 9.70 29.39
wealth01 213.48 1,041.91 109.55 432.17
38Table 5, continued.
Stayers Movers
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
debts01 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.50
appliedwelfare01 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12
foodstamps01 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.23
powercouple 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
vacancy_01 0.53 0.27 0.59 0.26
vacancy_03 0.53 0.27 0.55 0.27
medrent_01 0.65 0.27 0.66 0.24
medrent_03 0.65 0.27 0.66 0.26
medvalue_01 141.47 102.05 137.59 101.09
medvalue_03 141.47 102.05 140.79 105.65
urban_01 0.78 0.36 0.85 0.31
urban_03 0.78 0.36 0.81 0.34
meanwage_01 33.89 7.55 34.29 7.01
meanwage_03 33.89 7.55 34.13 6.89
hsdropout18_01 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.12
hsdropout18_03 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.12
hsdegree18_01 0.29 0.10 0.27 0.10
hsdegree18_03 0.29 0.10 0.28 0.10
collegemore18_01 0.29 0.17 0.31 0.17
collegemore18_03 0.29 0.17 0.30 0.17
notenrolled517_01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
notenrolled517_03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
nogoodenglish517_01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
nogoodenglish517_03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
poverty_01 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11
poverty_03 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10
ownrace_01 0.75 0.26 0.72 0.27
ownrace_03 0.75 0.26 0.72 0.28
ownrace_in_01 0.44 0.15 0.49 0.17
ownrace_in_03 0.44 0.15 0.49 0.18
all_in_01 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.05
all_in_03 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.06
violent_01 473.66 349.57 509.93 359.62
violent_03 473.66 349.57 519.05 376.42
property_01 3,422.76 1,653.97 3,799.22 1,649.40
property_03 3,422.76 1,653.97 3,812.30 1,669.06







































Linear IV IV Probit
w/o kids with kids w/o kids with kids
Individual:
age -0.01** -0.02** -0.04** -0.06**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02]
age2 0.01** 0.02** 0.03* 0.05*
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
HWblack 0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.23
[0.05] [0.06] [0.23] [0.23]
HWhisp 0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.48
[0.06] [0.07] [0.30] [0.25]
HWwhite 0.07 -0.04 0.34 -0.17
[0.05] [0.06] [0.23] [0.24]
HWcatholic -0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.13
[0.02] [0.02] [0.09] [0.10]
HWprotestant 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
[0.02] [0.02] [0.08] [0.09]
HWjewish 0.03 -0.09* 0.17 -0.6
[0.05] [0.04] [0.19] [0.35]
HWother 0.13* -0.06 0.44 -0.3
[0.07] [0.06] [0.23] [0.29]
northeast -0.02 0.02 -0.09 0.06
[0.03] [0.03] [0.12] [0.15]
northcentral 0.04 0.06* 0.14 0.25*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.10] [0.12]
south 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08
[0.03] [0.03] [0.10] [0.11]
foreign 0.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.3
[0.04] [0.04] [0.16] [0.19]
alcohol01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06
[0.02] [0.02] [0.06] [0.07]
military01 -0.04 0.05 -0.15 0.18
[0.04] [0.04] [0.16] [0.15]
dkids -0.07** 0.02 -0.25** 0.08
[0.02] [0.01] [0.06] [0.04]
nevermarried01 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.25*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.11] [0.12]
41Table 7, continued.
Linear IV IV Probit
w/o kids with kids w/o kids with kids
widowed01 0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.06
[0.03] [0.05] [0.13] [0.25]
divorced01 0.01 -0.08* 0.05 -0.32*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.11] [0.12]
separated01 0.00 -0.08 0.07 -0.33
[0.05] [0.04] [0.16] [0.17]
dstatus 0.10** 0.08* 0.30** 0.27*
[0.03] [0.04] [0.11] [0.13]
dropout -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.11
[0.04] [0.04] [0.15] [0.13]
highschool -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.18
[0.04] [0.03] [0.14] [0.12]
collegemore 0.05** 0.02 0.20** 0.08
[0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.09]
unemp01 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.2
[0.04] [0.03] [0.12] [0.12]
Hretired01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.19
[0.02] [0.06] [0.10] [0.29]
Hselfemp01 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.17
[0.02] [0.03] [0.11] [0.12]
Hunion01 0.02 0.00 0.10 -0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.10] [0.10]
tenuretot -0.00* -0.00* -0.01* -0.01*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
newjob 0.05** 0.03 0.21** 0.13
[0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
dhealth -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.17
[0.02] [0.02] [0.09] [0.09]
owner01 -0.06 -0.14* -0.37* -0.48*
[0.06] [0.06] [0.18] [0.23]
income01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
incomeincrease 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
incomedecrease 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
42Table 7, continued.
Linear IV IV Probit
w/o kids with kids w/o kids with kids
wealth01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
debts01 0.00 0.03* -0.02 0.14*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.06] [0.07]
appliedwelfare01 -0.06 0.02 -0.23 0.02
[0.05] [0.05] [0.25] [0.18]
foodstamps01 -0.07* -0.02 -0.29 -0.03
[0.04] [0.03] [0.15] [0.10]
powercouple -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.15
[0.03] [0.04] [0.15] [0.15]
Housing market:
vacancy_01 0.22 0.09 0.74 0.27
[0.17] [0.19] [0.60] [0.69]
vacancy_03 -0.21 -0.10 -0.72 -0.30
[0.20] [0.23] [0.70] [0.87]
medvalue_01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
medvalue_03 0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.01*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
medrent_01 -0.27 -0.06 -0.61 -1.11
[0.25] [0.34] [0.91] [1.34]
medrent_03 0.22 0.10 0.41 1.28
[0.27] [0.37] [1.01] [1.43]
medvalue_01_x_owner 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
medvalue_03_x_owner 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
medrent_01_x_renter 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
medrent_03_x_renter 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
43Table 7, continued.
Linear IV IV Probit
w/o kids with kids w/o kids with kids
Labor market:
meanwage_01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
meanwage_03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
urban_01 -0.14 0.02 -0.7 0.09
[0.13] [0.14] [0.40] [0.48]
urban_03 0.19 -0.01 0.92* -0.08
[0.14] [0.16] [0.47] [0.56]
Social Interactions:
hsdropout18_01 0.03 -0.08 -0.19 -0.81
[0.65] [0.74] [2.18] [2.52]
hsdropout18_03 0.01 0.51 0.32 2.48
[0.75] [0.87] [2.58] [3.05]
hsdegree18_01 -0.09 0.90 0.10 3.18
[0.96] [0.88] [3.32] [3.03]
hsdegree18_03 0.26 -1.14 0.57 -3.93
[1.07] [1.03] [3.79] [3.65]
collegemore18_01 -0.04 0.72 -0.34 2.33
[0.72] [0.78] [2.48] [2.62]
collegemore18_03 0.2 -0.61 0.82 -1.61
[0.81] [0.90] [2.86] [3.16]
notenrolled1017_01 -2.27* -0.82 -8.52* -2.56
[1.15] [1.74] [3.68] [6.36]
notenrolled1017_03 2.7 0.43 10.17* 0.85
[1.39] [2.18] [4.69] [7.97]
nogoodeng517_01 0.99 4.17** 3.99 15.74**
[1.11] [1.43] [3.98] [5.64]
nogoodeng517_03 -1.81 -5.11** -7.42 -19.60**
[1.39] [1.69] [5.13] [6.82]
poverty_01 0.50 1.24* 2.05 4.09*
[0.44] [0.59] [1.46] [1.96]
poverty_03 -0.65 -1.58* -2.68 -5.24*
[0.53] [0.71] [1.79] [2.45]
44Table 7, continued.
Linear IV IV Probit
w/o kids with kids w/o kids with kids
Cultural transmission:
own_race_01 0.03 0.01 0.17 0.15
[0.14] [0.15] [0.45] [0.54]
own_race_03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.5 -0.25
[0.15] [0.17] [0.51] [0.61]
own_race_in_01 0.08 -1.17** 0.64 -3.48*
[0.41] [0.38] [1.42] [1.36]
own_race_in_03 -0.04 1.40** -0.5 4.46**
[0.44] [0.41] [1.61] [1.55]
Neighborhood stability:
all_in_01 0.05 2.74* -0.27 8.04*
[1.17] [1.12] [3.90] [3.86]
all_in_03 0.19 -2.74* 1.39 -7.94
[1.31] [1.25] [4.56] [4.47]
Crime
violent_01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
violent_03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
property_01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
property_03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.44* 0.71** -0.36 0.56
[0.21] [0.25] [0.77] [0.95]
Observations 3360 2805 3360 2805
Robust standard errors in brackets
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1
45Table 8. OLS and IV estimates compared.
without kids with kids
OLS IV OLS IV
Social Interactions:
Kids with poor linguistic skills, 2001 -0.22 0.99 0.82 4.17**
[0.66] [1.11] [0.77] [1.43]
Kids with poor linguistic skills, 2003 -0.22 -1.81 -0.97 -5.11**
[0.67] [1.39] [0.79] [1.69]
Poverty, 2001 0.26 0.5 0.31 1.24*
[0.28] [0.44] [0.32] [0.59]
Poverty, 2003 -0.32 -0.65 -0.41 -1.58*
[0.29] [0.53] [0.34] [0.71]
Cultural transmission:
Own group recently moved in, 2001 -0.13 0.08 -0.76** -1.17**
[0.25] [0.41] [0.21] [0.38]
Own group recently moved in, 2003 0.21 -0.04 0.91** 1.40**
[0.24] [0.44] [0.20] [0.41]
Neighborhood stability:
Recently moved in, 2001 0.22 0.05 2.10** 2.74*
[0.71] [1.17] [0.65] [1.12]
Recently moved in, 2003 0.1 0.19 -1.99** -2.74*
[0.70] [1.31] [0.63] [1.25]
46Figure 1. Distribution of residuals and normal density
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47Figure 2. Residuals for movers and non movers
top: w/out children; bottom: w/ children
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